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Summary 
 Foreign aid looms large in the public discourse; and international 
development assistance remains squarely on most policy agendas con-
cerned with growth, poverty and inequality in Africa and elsewhere in 
the developing world. The present review takes a retrospective look at 
how foreign aid has evolved since World War II in response to a 
dramatically changing global political and economic context. I review 
the aid process and associated trends in the volume and distribution 
of aid and categorize some of the key goals, principles and institutions 
of the aid system. The evidence on whether aid has been effective in 
furthering economic growth and development is discussed in some 
detail. I add perspective and identify some critical unresolved issues. I 
finally turn to the current development debate and discuss some key 
concerns, I believe should be kept in mind in formulating any agenda 
for aid in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: F35, O10. 
Key words: Foreign aid, aid impact. 
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Foreign aid and its effectiveness in promoting growth and develop-
ment in developing countries has been an area of intense controversy 
ever since Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) advocated aid to Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe. Early optimism and confidence in the impact 
of foreign aid have been tempered with time. Browsing through suc-
cessive editions of a leading text book in development economics 
provides an illustration. In the first edition of his Leading Issues in Eco-
nomic Development, Meier (1964) dedicated some 18 pages to the issue 
of foreign aid. He started out by asking: “How much aid?” By the 
time of the 6th edition (Meier, 1995), the treatment of foreign aid had 
been cut in half, and the questions raised were: “Why official assis-
tance?”, and “Does aid work?”. In the 2000 edition (Meier and Rauch, 
2000), “foreign aid” is not even listed in the index.  
Meanwhile the debate about the usefulness and design of foreign 
aid has continued unabated. Some insist that aid is a waste of re-
sources and even harmful to aid receiving countries, Dichter (2005). 
In particular, they point to Africa and scores of failed projects and 
swiftly conclude that aid has been an outright disaster. Others are dis-
appointed and sceptical, a prominent example being Easterly (2001, 
2003, 2005, 2006), who highlights aid’s inability to buy growth. Bird-
sall, Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) view the potential impact of aid 
as seriously circumscribed, but remain largely supportive. A comple-
mentary approach in the middle ground is that aid has worked in the 
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to colleagues from University of Copenhagen for comments and collaboration. A special thanks to 
Phil Abbott, Carl Johan Dalgaard, Henning Tarp Jensen and Theo Larsen. Thanks for good 
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16-17 June 2006, and (iv) a departmental seminar at Purdue University on 6 October 2006. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge with sincere appreciation the critique and most constructive 
expert advice received from both an anonymous referee and professor Arne Bigsten. The usual 
caveats apply. 
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past in furthering growth and development, see Tarp (2000). Aid is 
not equally effective everywhere, and much remains to be learnt about 
how aid impacts in theory and practice. The focus should therefore be 
both on ways and means to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid 
disbursements and on increasing the total flow of resources. A final 
approach is to emphasize that a doubling of worldwide aid flows is 
our generation’s challenge, a moral obligation of rich countries that 
will send “forth mighty currents of hope” and lead to “the end of 
poverty”, see Sachs (2005).  
The analysis of aid’s impact on growth became dominated by 
macro-econometric frameworks during the second half of the 1990’s. 
Much of this debate has focused on whether the effectiveness of aid 
is conditional on policy or whether aid can be expected to have a 
separate and positive impact, independent of policy. This has in-
volved a mixture of concerns, which range from technically demand-
ing econometric modelling issues to fundamentally different ap-
proaches to the design and implementation of development strategy 
and policy. Overall, the view that aid works in promoting growth and 
development has gained ground in the academic literature in recent 
years; but disagreement remains characteristic in assessments of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for aid to have a positive contribu-
tion on the development process. The same goes in relation to (i) dif-
ferent views on what constitutes “good” economic policy and how 
economic policy and deeper structural characteristics interact with the 
efficiency of foreign aid, and (ii) the institutional framework through 
which aid is channelled. Aid has, for example, been subjected to cri-
tique for being donor driven, and this has led to repeated demands 
for new forms of partnership, see Helleiner (2000). One response has 
been to shift the attention to recipient country “ownership”, but what 
this means in theory and practice remains subject to differing inter-
pretations. 
Nevertheless, widespread calls have in the last few years been 
made for “a big push” or a Marshall Plan for Africa. Sachs (2005) is a 
passionate spokesman for this approach, which is set out in the UN 
Millennium Project Report (2002, 2005). The World Economic Fo-
rum (2005) and the Commission for Africa (2005) reports can also be 
consulted. The Commission for Africa was launched by the British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair in February 2004 with the aim of taking a 
fresh look at Africa’s past and present and the international commu-
nity’s role in its development path. These initiatives have called forth 
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both praise and critique, with Sachs and Easterly appearing to occupy 
opposing ends of the spectrum. Viewing their assessments from the 
perspective of historical developments in foreign aid, on the one 
hand, and the analytical literature on aid effectiveness, on the other, is 
a general aim of this paper. 
The remainder of this study is structured in six parts.1 In Section 1, 
I define what is meant by foreign aid and provide selected data on 
amounts and trends involved. Section 2 contains a general historical 
background, while Sections 3 and 4 turn to the allocation and impact 
of foreign aid. In Section 5, I discuss the current debate, while Section 
6 concludes. 
1. What is foreign aid? 
What is foreign aid? Loosely speaking, it covers governmental trans-
fers to poor countries that are destined for developmental purposes. 
For a more precise definition, it is useful to turn to the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. DAC is the principal 
body through which the OECD deals with issues related to co-
operation with developing countries. According to DAC, the term 
“foreign aid” or “development assistance” refers to financial flows 
that qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA is de-
fined as the sum of grants and loans to aid recipients that are: (a) un-
dertaken by the official sector of the donor country; (b) with promo-
tion of economic development and welfare in recipient countries as 
the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms, where the grant 
element is equal to at least 25 per cent.2  
 
1 In preparing this review, I rely both on field experience and a variety of academic 
outputs. They include (i) a Routledge book volume on “Foreign Aid and Development: 
Lessons learnt and Directions for the Future” (see Tarp, 2000); (ii) several articles pub-
lished over the past five years, in particular including work with Dalgaard, Hansen 
and Roland-Holst listed in the references; and (iii) the notes from my inaugural 
lecture held at University of Copenhagen on 29 November 2002 under the heading 
“Reflections on the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid”. Please see Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2006) 
for a companion paper to the present article, focusing on what can be said about 
aid and development in a specific country context—that of Mozambique. 
2 Conventionally, the market rate of interest used to assess a loan is taken as 10 per 
cent. Thus, while the grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10 
per cent, it is 100 per cent for a pure grant, and lies between these two limits for a 
soft loan. In calculating total ODA, no adjustment is made to take account of the 
smaller grant element of loans. The value of grants and the nominal value of loans 
that qualify are simply added up. 
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In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation costs are in-
cluded in ODA; but grants, loans and credits for military purposes are 
excluded, and transfer payments to private individuals are in general 
not counted. The same goes for private charity, commercial loans and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). 
While the OECD operates with a consolidated list of recipient 
countries to capture all aid-like flows, this list was divided into two 
parts until 2005. Only aid to “traditional” developing countries 
counted as ODA. For these (Part I) countries, there is a long-standing 
United Nations (UN) target from 1970 that they should receive 0.7 
per cent of donors” Gross National Income (GNI) as aid. Assistance 
to the “more advanced” Eastern European and “more advanced” de-
veloping (Part II) countries was recorded separately as “official aid” 
(OA), not included as part of ODA. It can finally be noted that DAC 
countries account for almost 95 per cent of all aid flows.3  
In 2002, the total amount of foreign aid disbursed by donors to 
developing countries and multilateral organisations reached 61.5 bil-
lion USD (Table 1). Table 1 also shows that the average citizen in the 
OECD-DAC countries contributed less than USD 68 as ODA in 
2002. This can be compared to a figure of around USD 52 in 1960-73 
and almost USD 77 in 1992.4 It is equally clear from the table that the 
UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI is, with few exceptions, very far 
from being reached. In this perspective, it is hardly surprising that 
some, such as Sach (2005) and many others, find the present levels of 
aid unacceptably low. It can also be noted that multilateral organisa-
tions are now disbursing around 30 per cent of total foreign aid, with 
the IMF and World Bank being the major channels, followed by the 
EU, the UN and the regional development banks (Table 2). 
 
3 The OECD decided in 2005 to revert to a single list of ODA recipients, abolish-
ing what is referred to as Part II in what follows. The new DAC list of ODA recipi-
ents is with a few exceptions consistent with World Bank practice, see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/56/0,2340,en_2649_34447_35832055_1_1_1_1,0
0.html for full details on the rather complicated set of changes that have taken place 
over the years.  
4 Note that constant 2002 prices are relied on in Table 1. Only sixteen of the now 
22 DAC member countries had joined the DAC before 1970, so the concept of an 
“average DAC citizen” is not strictly the same over time, see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/38/0,2340,en_2649_33721_1893350_1_1_1_1,00
.html.  
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Table 1. Net ODA disbursements by donor 
 2002 Prices - $ Billion Percent of total 
 
ODA per capita  
(2002 Prices - $) Percent of donor GNI 
 1960-73 1992 1998 2002 1960-73 1992 1998 2002 
US 14.7 14.1 9.4 13.3 47.1 23.0 18.3 21.6 
 74.9 55.3 34.8 46.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Japan 2.5 10.5 10.4 9.3 8.0 17.1 20.2 15.1 
 24.5 84.4 82.2 72.8 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
France 3.9 7.2 5.1 5.5 12.8 11.8 9.9 8.9 
 80.6 126.2 87.3 92.3 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Germany 2.8 6.6 4.9 5.3 9.1 10.7 9.5 8.7 
 48.0 81.4 59.5 64.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
UK 3.2 3.6 3.8 4.9 10.2 5.8 7.4 8.0 
 58.0 61.3 64.7 83.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 
DK, NL,  
NO and SE 1.3 7.1 7.4 8.7 4.2 11.5 14.4 14.1 
 44.6 211.9 217.0 248.2 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.9 
Other DAC 2.6 10.9 9.4 11.3 8.5 17.8 18.2 18.4 
 23.0 57.9 46.0 53.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Non-DAC .. 1.4 1.0 3.2 .. 2.2 2.0 5.2 
 .. .. .. 67.2 .. 0.3 0.1 0.4 
Total 31.0 61.3 51.5 61.5 100 100 100 100 
 51.6 76.9 61.7 67.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Bilateral ODA 26.5 41.9 34.9 43.5 85.5 68.3 67.8 70.7 
Multilateral 
ODA 4.9 19.1 16.6 18.0 15.6 31.1 32.2 29.3 
Notes: Denmark (DK) since 1978, Netherlands (NL) since 1975, Norway (NO) 
since 1976, and Sweden (SE) since 1975 have all had ODA in percent of GNI 
above 0.7. Luxembourg has been above the UN ODA target of 0.7 per cent since 
2000. 
Source: OECD (2004). 
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Table 2. Multilateral aid disbursements 
 2002 Prices - $ Billion Percent  
 1960-73 1992 1998 2002 1960-73 1992 1998 2002 
Multilateral, 
total of which: 2.8 16.3 14.4 17.0 100 100 100 100 
UN 0.9 5.3 2.6 3.8 31.4 32.6 17.9 22.1 
IMF and WB 0.8 5.3 5.0 6.0 30.0 32.7 35.0 35.1 
European 
Commission 0.6 3.8 4.6 5.1 23.1 23.1 32.3 30.3 
Regional de-
velopment 
banks 0.4 1.6 1.9 1.8 15.4 10.0 13.2 10.5 
Other multilat-
eral institutions 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Source: OECD (2004). 
 
Table 3 gives an overview of aid per capita and aid in per cent of 
GNI in aid receiving Part I countries with a population of more than 
2 million. It is a widespread perception in, for example, the US that 
foreign aid amounts to a very significant resource, in both absolute 
and relative terms, and aid is indeed not an insignificant flow meas-
ured relative to developing country production and income. At the 
same time, aid does not appear that sizeable when measured in rela-
tion to GNI or government budgets in the donor countries or in 
comparison with the population size of aid receiving countries. 
Turning to the aid receiving countries, the available data confirm 
that global aid levels have kept pace with both incomes and popula-
tion in the developing world during the past three decades. Figure 1 
presents ratios of total ODA to GNI and the population in aid receiv-
ing countries. ODA per capita almost doubled in real terms; but per-
haps the most revealing aspect here is the downturn from 1991-92 
after the steady increase in the previous decade. The fact that aid has 
only remained more or less stable as a share of GNI in recipient 
countries is also evident. 
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Table 3. Average annual (1993-2002) aid shares for countries 
with populations larger than 2 million 
Country Aid per capita      Country Country 
Aid in %  
of GNI Country 
Malaysia 0.3 23.5 Tunisia Saudi Arabia 0.0 7.4 Georgia 
Saudi Arabia 1.2 24.1 Burundi Malaysia 0.0 7.6 Papua New G. 
Brazil 1.7 24.1 Sri Lanka Argentina 0.0 8.1 Cote d’Ivoire 
India 1.7 26.1 Togo Venezuela, RB 0.0 8.3 Nepal 
Nigeria 1.8 28.1 Zimbabwe Brazil 0.1 8.4 Togo 
Venezuela, RB 1.8 28.2 Madagascar Mexico 0.1 8.4 Angola 
China 2.0 29.2 Niger Turkey 0.1 9.0 Bolivia 
Mexico 2.0 29.3 Chad Iran, Islamic R. 0.2 9.3 Honduras 
Myanmar 2.2 30.6 Somalia Chile 0.2 9.3 Guinea 
Iran, Islamic R. 2.5 30.9 Liberia Costa Rica 0.2 9.9 Albania 
Argentina 3.4 31.1 Egypt, Arab R. Uruguay 0.2 10.1 Tajikistan 
Turkey 3.5 32.0 Tanzania Colombia 0.3 10.2 Ghana 
Korea, Dem. R. 4.1 32.3 Angola China 0.3 10.9 Serbia and M. 
Congo, Dem. R. 5.2 33.1 Uganda South Africa 0.4 11.3 Madagascar 
Uzbekistan 5.2 33.5 Ghana Oman 0.4 11.6 Senegal 
Cuba 5.2 34.2 Cambodia Panama 0.4 11.7 Haiti 
Colombia 5.3 35.1 Central Afric. R. India 0.4 11.8 Benin 
Turkmenistan 7.0 35.3 Cameroon Croatia 0.5 11.8 Cent. Afric. R. 
Costa Rica 7.1 39.6 Burkina Faso Thailand 0.5 11.9 Cambodia 
Indonesia 7.3 40.9 Mali Algeria 0.6 12.0 Armenia 
Chile 7.4 42.7 Eritrea Dominican R. 0.7 12.5 Congo, Rep. 
Kazakhstan 8.6 42.9 Benin Kazakhstan 0.7 13.5 Chad 
Iraq 8.8 43.0 Sierra Leone Nigeria 0.7 13.7 Uganda 
Pakistan 8.8 43.3 Georgia Peru 0.9 14.2 Kyrgyz R. 
Sudan 9.2 44.4 El Salvador Turkmenistan 0.9 14.2 Ethiopia 
Algeria 9.2 44.8 Malawi Indonesia 1.0 15.1 Tanzania 
Bangladesh 9.8 45.2 Haiti Jamaica 1.0 15.5 Niger 
South Africa 10.6 45.2 Kyrgyz Republic Ecuador 1.1 16.2 Burkina Faso 
Thailand 10.8 45.7 Guinea Philippines 1.1 16.3 W. Bank & G. 
Philippines 11.4 55.3 Cote d’Ivoire Paraguay 1.2 17.0 Mali 
Dominican R. 12.2 55.6 Lao PDR Tunisia 1.2 17.6 Lao PDR 
Afghanistan 12.8 56.5 Lebanon Uzbekistan 1.4 18.2 Burundi 
Uruguay 13.0 58.3 Senegal Guatemala 1.4 19.3 Liberia 
Panama 13.2 63.0 Papua N. Guinea Lebanon 1.7 21.5 Eritrea 
Vietnam 14.3 63.3 Serbia and M. Morocco 1.8 23.1 Mongolia 
Ethiopia 14.8 64.1 Rwanda Pakistan 2.0 23.8 Zambia 
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Table 3. Continued…. 
Country Aid per capita      Country Country 
Aid in %  
of GNI Country 
Ecuador 16.5 65.1 Congo, Rep. Syrian Arab R. 2.0 25.4 Malawi 
Peru 17.3 65.2 Armenia El Salvador 2.6 25.7 Bosnia and H. 
Syrian Arab R. 17.5 65.6 Mozambique Egypt, Arab R. 2.8 27.1 Sierra Leone 
Tajikistan 18.0 71.9 Honduras Bangladesh 2.9 27.5 Mauritania 
Nepal 18.2 81.6 Bolivia Sudan 3.1 30.8 Rwanda 
Paraguay 18.7 82.6 Zambia Sri Lanka 3.2 31.6 Nicaragua 
Croatia 18.9 85.7 Albania Azerbaijan 3.8 40.3 Mozambique 
Kenya 19.7 87.0 Mongolia Vietnam 4.3     
Yemen, Rep. 20.4 100.4 Jordan Congo, Dem. R. 4.9     
Azerbaijan 20.7 103.9 Mauritania Zimbabwe 5.2     
Morocco 20.9 130.4 Nicaragua Yemen, Rep. 5.4     
Jamaica 21.4 186.1 Bosnia and H. Cameroon 5.9     
Guatemala 22.2 233.6 W. Bank & G. Jordan 6.3     
Oman 22.6     Kenya 6.8     
 
Figure 2 shows that the allocation of aid from 1993 to 2002 as 
measured by the aid to GNI ratio in aid receiving countries is highly 
skewed. Most Part I countries received aid in the order of 3.1 per cent 
of their GNI per year with a median of 6.8 per cent. This corresponds 
to a distribution of aid per capita with a mode of 18.5 USD per year 
and a median of 34.6 USD. Illustrative country examples have been 
added to Figure 2. They demonstrate that the relative size of the aid 
inflow varies significantly among countries such as Vietnam, Bolivia, 
Tanzania and Mozambique.  
The 15.1 per cent size of the aid to GNI ratio in, for example, 
Tanzania may seem high. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
this share does not only reflect the size of the aid flow, but also the 
very low level of income. Income per capita in Tanzania has just re-
cently grown to around USD 300 per capita. Tanzania only received 
about USD 32 per capita per year in foreign aid from 1993 to 2002.  
Against this background, modest expectations are advisable when 
analysing the overall impact of past aid on growth.  Many constraints 
have hampered growth in Tanzania and elsewhere, and aid has been 
used for a multitude of purposes. They are in many cases only indi-
rectly related to generating economic return. 
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Figure 1. ODA per capita and as a percent of GNI in  
the recipient country 
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Note: ODA and GNI in constant 1995 USD, and shares normalized to 1 in 1970. 
Source: World Bank (2004). 
Figure 2. Density of average annual (1993-2002) ODA shares 
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Note: Kernel density using Gaussian kernel. The height of the graph reflects the 
(weighted) average number of observations in an interval around the midpoint. 
Source: World Bank (2004). 
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2. Historical background 
Foreign aid in its modern form emerged out of the disruption that 
followed World War II. The international economic system had col-
lapsed, and war-ravaged Europe faced a critical shortage of capital 
and an acute need for physical reconstruction. The response was the 
European Recovery Programme, commonly known as the Marshall 
Plan. During the peak years, the US transferred some 2-3 per cent of 
its national income to help restore Europe. The motives behind the 
US aid were multifaceted, ranging from the selfish to the generous. 
Containing communism around the Soviet bloc and trying to secure 
access to raw materials and gain a leading role in the global trade and 
investment system were critically important nationalistic concerns. 
Altruistic aims, on the other hand, helped mobilize support from a 
wide spectrum of political opinion. The Marshall Plan, which was 
administered by the Organization for European Economic Coopera-
tion (OEEC), the predecessor of the OECD, was implemented on 
schedule, and its success fuelled highly optimistic expectations about 
the future effectiveness of foreign aid.  
After the success of the Marshall Plan, the attention of industrial-
ized nations turned to the developing countries, many of which be-
came independent around 1960. Economic growth in a state-led 
planning tradition became a key objective during the 1950’s and 
1960’s, and it was widely believed that poverty and inequality would 
quickly be eliminated through growth and modernization (“trickle 
down”). A major part of the rapidly increasing bilateral flows during 
the 1950’s came from the US, but colonial ties remained strong, and 
developing regions continued to receive bilateral (country-to-country) 
support from the former colonial powers, notably France and the 
United Kingdom. Yet, the 1960’s was also the decade where a range 
of new bilateral donor agencies was established in, for example, the 
Nordic countries. They accounted for much of the increase in aid 
flows in the 1970’s.  
A transition toward more independent, multilateral relations began 
to emerge during the 1960’s. This created a constituency for foreign 
aid, and the non-aligned movement for some time gave an articulated 
developing country focus to this voice,5 as did the various organs of 
 
5 The first official non-aligned movement (NAM) summit was held in September of 
1961. Among the prominent developing country leaders, who helped NAM get off 
the ground, were Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru of India, Nasser of Egypt and Sukarno 
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the UN. They accounted for around one third of multilateral assis-
tance during 1960-73 as shown in Table 2. The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (or World Bank), estab-
lished at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, plays a central role 
in multilateral development assistance, especially following the crea-
tion of the International Development Association (IDA) in 1960. 
IDA channels resources to the poorest countries on “soft” conditions 
alongside the regional development banks, formed from 1959 to 
1966, and the European Commission. 
The original Marshall Plan was built around support to finance 
general categories of imports and strengthen the balance of payments 
(i.e. programme aid), but from the early 1950’s, project aid became 
the dominating aid modality. Some donors continued to supply pro-
gramme aid, but aid was increasingly disbursed for the implementa-
tion of specific capital investment projects and associated technical 
assistance with support advances in infrastructure and productive sec-
tors.  
The multilateralism of aid became somewhat more pronounced af-
ter the mid-1970’s, when the UN, World Bank and other multilateral 
agencies expanded their activities quite considerably, and the share of 
multilateral aid in total aid has since then remained close to 30 per 
cent. The 1970’s also saw an increased focus on employment, income 
distribution, and poverty alleviation as essential objectives of devel-
opment and foreign aid. The effectiveness of trickle-down was widely 
questioned, and new strategies referred to as “basic human needs’ and 
“redistribution with growth” were formulated. Nevertheless, the typi-
cal project aid modality largely remained unchanged; and micro-
economic project evaluation, also referred to as cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA), was expanded and widely relied on in the aid debate. Many 
projects were favourably evaluated, and during the 1960’s and 1970’s, 
economic progress was visible in much of the developing world. 
Many developing countries borrowed heavily during the 1970’s, and 
this made eminent sense at the time. Inflation was high and credit ex-
ceedingly cheap. After the first oil crisis in 1973, commercial banks 
started playing a large role in international lending by recycling OPEC 
petrodollars and issuing general-purpose loans to developing coun-
 
of Indonesia. Formally speaking, the non-aligned movement is an international 
organization of over 100 developing countries, which consider themselves not for-
mally aligned with or against any major power bloc. While influential during the 
1960’s and 1970’s, NAM started losing influence in the 1970’s. 
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tries to provide balance of payment support and expand exports. Bi-
lateral donors and the international financial institutions (IFIs) were 
no longer alone on the lending scene. International lending surged, 
which permitted high growth with little debt-servicing difficulty. 
The “golden era” of the 1960’s and 1970’s came to an abrupt end 
at the beginning of the 1980’s. The second oil shock in 1979 reversed 
the economic conditions, and there was a huge increase in interest 
rates due to the economic stabilization policies in the developed 
countries. Developing countries were faced with a combination of 
higher oil prices, import compression and a significant decrease in 
export opportunities due to slower overall global growth. The interna-
tional debt crisis erupted, and macroeconomic imbalance became 
characteristic. It became evident that the downturn was longer lasting, 
not temporary as in 1973, and numerous debtor countries with de-
pleted foreign exchange reserves, including bigger third world coun-
tries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and the Philippines, had to 
turn to the IMF. On the political scene, Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher came into power in the US and the UK, and in the World 
Bank, Anne Krueger became Vice President and Chief Economist, 
replacing Hollis Chenery. This change was symbolic and substantive 
(Kanbur, 2003). Economic circumstances in the developing countries 
and the relations between the North and South had changed radically. 
The crisis hit hard, especially in many African countries. Progress 
over previous decades ground to a halt, inflation got out of control 
and the deficit in the balance of payments could not be financed on a 
sustainable basis. The Focus of development strategy and policy 
shifted to internal domestic policy failure, and achieving macroeco-
nomic balance (externally and internally) became widely perceived as 
an essential prerequisite for renewed development. In parallel, a series 
of damaging political and military conflicts broke out, including mass 
homicides, major refugee problems and famines in a variety of Afri-
can countries. 
“Rolling back the state” turned into a rallying call in the subse-
quent structural adjustment efforts, and reliance on market forces, 
outward orientation, and the role of the private sector, including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were emphasized by the World 
Bank and others. In parallel, poverty alleviation somehow slipped out 
of view in mainstream agendas for economic reform, but remained at 
the centre of attention in more un-orthodox thinking such as the “ad-
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justment with a human face” approach of the UN Children’s Fund 
(Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987).  
At the same time, bilateral donors and international agencies strug-
gled with how to channel resources to the developing world. The 
changing economic context and future perspectives had altered the 
development scene. Quick-disbursing macroeconomic programme 
assistance, such as balance of payments support and sector budget 
support (which were not tied to investment projects, and which could 
be justified under the headings of stabilisation and adjustment), ap-
peared to be an ideal solution to the dilemma of maintaining the re-
source flow and the desire to promote policy reform. Financial pro-
gramme aid and adjustment loans (and eventually debt relief) became 
fashionable and policy conditionality more widespread. In other 
words, a rationale, which corresponded well with the orthodox guide-
lines for good policy summarized by the “Washington consensus” 
(Williamson, 1997), had been found for maintaining the aid flow.6  
Total aid continued to grow steadily in real terms until the early 
1990’s, and as a rising share of the growing national income of the 
donor community it more than tripled during 1970–90. After 1992, 
total aid flows started to decline in absolute terms until the turn of the 
millennium. Many reasons account for the fall in aggregate flows after 
1992, including first of all the end of the Cold War. The same can be 
said for the weakening patron-client relationships among the develop-
ing countries and the former colonial powers. The traditional support 
of foreign aid by vocal interest groups in the industrial countries re-
ceded. Bilateral and multilateral aid institutions were subjected to 
criticism and, at times, characterized as blunt instruments of commer-
cial interests in the industrial world or as self-interested, inefficient 
rent-seeking bureaucracies. Moreover, acute awareness in donor 
countries of cases of bad governance, corruption, and “crony capital-
ism” led to scepticism about the credibility of governments receiving 
aid. The potential role of foreign aid in all this attracted attention, and 
the fear that aid can generate undesirable dependency relationships 
became clear during the second part of the 1990’s and persisted into 
the 21st century.  
In parallel, the perception that policy conditionality was failing to 
promote policy reform started to assert itself, see Kanbur (2000) and 
Svensson (2003). This assessment prompted a keen interest in new 
 
6 See Rodrik (2006) for a critical up-to-date review. 
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kinds of donor-recipient relationships. One outcome was the call for 
increased national ownership of aid programmes. Another was that 
the World Bank and independent academic researchers started dig-
ging into the aid-growth relationship using modern analytical tech-
niques. More recent attempts to develop randomized programme 
evaluation also appeared on the scene, see for example Duflo (2004).7 
Meanwhile, the developing world was hit hard by the Asian financial 
crisis. It affected development outcomes in a number of countries 
and modified the framework within which aid is implemented. 
Finally, when reviewing the role and impact of foreign aid, it 
should be kept in mind that the world economy has during the past 
few decades seen major changes in international relations that go far 
beyond the changes in foreign aid. Growth in trade, GDP and the 
relationship between trade and growth have filled volumes with statis-
tical tables, policy analysis, and academic research. With reference to 
foreign aid, a few trends are of particular relevance.8 Figure 3 shows 
how global trade as well as ODA, GNI and FDI in aid-receiving 
countries evolved from 1970 onwards. This figure only reflects the 
relative changes in flows, not their relative magnitudes,9 but it is evi-
dent that global trade has been growing faster than both GNI and aid 
flows to poor countries. This is especially the case from around the 
mid-1980’s, and the importance of FDI started changing very consid-
erably in the early 1990’s.  
In sum, globalization has modified the context in which foreign 
aid is implemented. This suggests, on the one hand, that a broader 
and more refined awareness of the implications of coexistence be-
tween public and private investment in developing countries would be 
beneficial. On the other hand, it implies that aid’s role in generating 
foreign exchange has changed relative to other entries on the balance 
of payments. 
 
7 I will not pursue the set of issues related to this approach to aid impact evaluation 
here. See Bigsten, Gunning and Tarp (2006) and Thorbecke (2005) for elaboration. 
8 See also Roland-Holst and Tarp (2004). 
9 FDI accounted for only 2.3 per cent of GDP in low- and middle-income coun-
tries in 2003, and 0.6 per cent in 1990. Trade was 41 per cent in 1990 and 60 per 
cent in 2003. 
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Figure 3. Macroeconomic indicators in aid receiving countries 
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Notes: All variables are expressed as an index equal to one in 1970 and constructed 
from series in constant 1995 USD. FDI is constructed from net FDI inflows and 
trade is based on the sum of exports and trade is based on the sum of exports and 
imports. 
Source: World Bank (2004). 
3. Aid allocation 
Foreign aid has over the years been justified in public policy pro-
nouncements in widely differing ways, ranging from pure altruism to 
the shared benefits of economic development in poor countries and 
further on to political ideology, foreign policy and commercial inter-
ests of the donor country. Few dispute that humanitarian sentiments 
have also in practice motivated donors. Action following severe natu-
ral calamities, which continue to be endemic in poor countries, is an 
example. Food and emergency relief also remains an important form 
of aid. In addition, the data available in Table 3 suggest that donors 
allocate relatively more ODA to the poorest countries. The broader 
validity of this casual observation is confirmed in cross-country 
econometric work, see Alesina and Dollar (2000). While studying bi-
lateral aid only, they conclude that most donors give more aid to 
poorer countries, ceteris paribus. They also stress that there is consider-
able variation among donors. 
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Emphasis on the needs of poor countries was a particularly promi-
nent characteristic—and the underlying economic rationale—in much 
of the policy literature on foreign aid in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Here, 
the focus was on estimating aid requirements in the tradition of the 
two-gap model, (Chenery and Strout, 1966). The two-gap model has 
been subjected to heavy criticism,10 and the role of aid has changed to 
a much more multi-dimensional set of concerns (Thorbecke, 2000). 
Economic return is by no means the only goal of aid. Nevertheless, 
growth and economic development in aid receiving countries have 
continued as a yardstick for the effectiveness of aid, both in their own 
right and as necessary conditions for the realisation of other devel-
opment aims, such as the reduction of poverty and the achievement 
of broader social goals. It is from this perspective that the discussion 
in Section 4 on aid’s impact on growth should be seen. 
A second observation from Table 3 is that large, populous and 
poor countries, such as China and India receive relatively small 
amounts of aid in per capita terms. Smaller countries such as Mali, 
Ghana, Bolivia and Sri Lanka are given a more favourable per capita 
treatment. This finding is confirmed econometrically by Alesina and 
Dollar, but they stress the critical and complex importance of political 
and strategic considerations in aid allocations.  
It is not new that selfish motives are critical in donor decisions. In 
the past, the Cold War was used as a powerful justification for provid-
ing aid to developing countries to stem the spread of communism. 
Similarly, aid from socialist governments was motivated to promote 
socialist political and economic systems. Other strategic interests play 
a role as well. The US has over the years earmarked very substantial 
amounts of aid to Egypt and Israel;11 being a former colony is an im-
portant determinant in getting access to French aid; and voting be-
haviour in the UN can affect aid allocation both bilaterally (Alesina 
and Dollar, 2000) and through the multilateral system (Andersen, 
Harr and Tarp, 2006). Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Berthélemy 
(2006) offer further valuable insights into how bilateral donors are 
influenced in aid allocations by their own strategic and commercial 
interest versus the development motives of aid recipients, and into the 
fact that not all donors behave in the same way. 
 
10 See Jones (1995) and Easterly (1999) for two key references.  
11 To this list can be added Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, US aid to Iraq 
amounted to USD 3.5 billion in 2005.  
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In sum, the donor community has clearly failed to meet the estab-
lished international target of contributing 0.7 per cent of their national 
income as ODA. As shown in Table 1, only the group of Nordic 
countries and the Netherlands has consistently met this target, while 
the US contributed around 0.1 percent of the US GNI in 2002.12 Fi-
nally, it is well established that total ODA, ODA per capita, ODA as 
a share of GNI and ODA as a share of total financial inflows vary 
considerably in real terms among aid receiving countries (see Tarp, 
2006). All in all, donor motives are complex and range from equating 
aid with charity, on the one hand, to strict self-interest and national 
security, on the other.  
4. The impact of foreign aid 
Various approaches have been tried to deal with the challenge of 
measuring the “true” impact of aid on development, as reflected by 
growth or progress in social indicators, for example.13 One is to com-
pare implicit or explicit targets with actual outcomes. The problem 
with this is that failure or success in reaching a target may be caused 
by reasons that are related to the provision of foreign aid. Another 
quite common approach is to rely on before-and-after comparisons, 
but this line of analysis also suffers from its inherent inability to at-
tribute changes in observed outcomes to foreign aid. In other words, 
in assessing the impact of aid, it is not satisfactory to casually argue 
that since growth in Africa is far from satisfactory, aid “does not 
work”. Similarly, the fact that some aid projects have failed does not 
in any way prove that aid as a whole is a fiasco. Unsuccessful invest-
ment projects and public sector activities abound in even the best of 
political, social and economic circumstances around the world and 
few would dream of lambasting private multinational firms for failed 
initiatives if the bottom line is on average satisfactory. In fact, most 
people would probably agree that if investments are always successful, 
then investor behaviour is likely to be too risk averse. Development is 
and will always be a particularly risky business. Any serious analysis 
must either (i) try to dig deeper in an attempt to uncover whether for-
eign aid has on average had a positive impact on development in aid 
receiving countries or not, or (ii) aim at identifying the mechanisms 
 
12 This share has increased in the last couple of years, but US aid as a share of US 
GNI remains small.  
13 See Bigsten, Gunning and Tarp (2006) for further elaboration of this point. 
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through which aid impacts on for example growth, including the po-
tential positive and negative effects (i.e. returns) associated with for-
eign aid.  
To be able to measure the effect of aid, the researcher must, in 
principle, be able to compare the value of a chosen indicator (such as 
growth or poverty reduction) in two strictly independent situations: 
with and without aid. To establish the “true” measure of aid impact, 
the importance of all other circumstances that have affected a given 
country over time needs to be properly accounted for.14 Alternatively, 
if a group of countries is compared (with and without aid), the analyst 
needs to account for the impact on the chosen indicator of the other 
differences that exist among the units of observation, like in a con-
trolled experiment. This is the fundamental evaluation challenge and 
in social science, there is no way of addressing this problem (i.e. the 
challenge of establishing an appropriate counterfactual) in a broadly 
acceptable way without making assumptions that are bound to be de-
batable, in theory and in practice.  
In Section 3, it was pointed out that aid has been given for many 
reasons that have little relation to socio-economic advancement in aid 
receiving countries. This has undoubtedly constrained the impact of 
aid on growth and development. The targets for aid have also varied 
wildly from one decade to the next. The same goes for the general 
political, social and economic circumstances as discussed in Section 2, 
and the modalities and sources of aid have changed as well. As a re-
sult, the conditions under which aid has had to operate have changed 
dramatically from one decade to the next. Coming up with simple an-
swers about how aid has worked—or not worked—in promoting de-
velopment in the past is no easy task. We can draw on history, but we 
do not have the possibility of perfectly controlled experiments, in 
providing an answer to questions such as whether aggregate aid has 
worked or not. There is, to be sure, no simple way of properly ac-
counting for all the many varied and complex factors of daunting size, 
which have played a role in African development over the past 30 
years—alongside foreign aid generally amounting to around USD 35 
per capita per year.15  
 
14 This includes choosing the length of individual time units and an appropriate 
overall time horizon, which are by no means simple choices.  
15 Naturally, this does not mean that economics ignores the possibility of using 
both laboratory and field experiments to generate knowledge. Experimental eco-
nomics is a sub-discipline that has been advancing significantly in recent years. 
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In any case, the past decades have witnessed a massive outpouring 
of studies on the effectiveness of foreign aid. This topic has been a 
central and recurring theme with which many development econo-
mists, subscribing to the different paradigms of development think-
ing, have grappled and the methodologies have varied. More specifi-
cally: (i) the impact of aid has been evaluated at the micro- and mac-
roeconomic level; (ii) cross-country comparisons as well as single-
country case studies have been relied on; and (iii) aid effectiveness 
research includes broad surveys of a qualitative and inter-disciplinary 
nature as well as more quantitative econometric work.16 As a point of 
departure for the remainder of this paper, it is relevant to stress that 
there is widespread agreement in the literature that aid has in many 
cases been highly successful at the microeconomic level. The most 
rigorous project evaluations are done by the World Bank, and reports 
from the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank are gen-
erally encouraging. For the period 1993-2002, an average rate of re-
turn of 22 per cent has been noted and decent project rates of return 
have over the years regularly been reported in one survey after the 
other, including for example Mosley (1987) and Cassen and Associ-
ates (1994). Overall, a mass of project evidence has been collected. 
Few dispute that aid interventions have worked in helping improve 
social outcomes through better health, helping promote the develop-
ment of appropriate technology (i.e. the green revolution) etc. Yet, 
doubts about aid’s overall impact on growth and development linger 
on, and the question is regularly raised whether all this adds up at the 
macro level. 
Therefore, it is relevant to turn to how the empirical literature on 
aid’s macroeconomic impact on growth has evolved. This choice of 
focus can be justified on several grounds. First, as an extension of the 
microeconomic evidence, according to the World Bank (1998), nu-
merous case studies support the observation that aid has, at times, 
been a spectacular success. In establishing causal links, the critical 
challenge is, as noted above, to pinpoint a credible counterfactual, and 
it is never straightforward to generalize from case studies. Another 
reason for the popularity in the past 10-15 years of the cross-country 
panel data approach is that it makes it possible to move well beyond 
simplistic aid-growth correlation analysis, where the analysis of causal 
 
16 The reader may wish to consult for example Cassen and Associates (1994) for a 
useful survey with a broader scope than the present paper. Other references include 
World Bank (1998, 2000). 
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effects is indeed rather primitive. It should, in fact, come as no sur-
prise to the informed observer that the simple correlation coefficient 
between growth and aid can easily turn out to be insignificant, or 
negative. As already discussed, donors allocate more aid to poorer 
countries, subject to difficulties and shocks of many kinds, including 
natural and man made calamities. When countries have done well for 
a while so average income has gone up, donors tend to transfer less 
aid and eventually, they will withdraw (as it happened in for example 
the case of Korea). While such “graduation” may take a while, simple 
correlations are against this background likely to show a negative rela-
tionship; and they will certainly not reveal the “true” impact of aid. 
In modern aid-growth work, the analyst can attempt to control for 
the impact of a large range of variables, and in this way becomes able 
to move somewhat closer to the ideal of having a reliable counterfac-
tual.17 The analyst is, at least in principle, capable of addressing issues 
such as the identification problem inherent in having aid endoge-
nously allocated in the foreign aid system. Second, a focus on growth 
makes it, in a wider perspective, possible to draw on both traditional 
growth theory and new growth models to illustrate how aid can po-
tentially impact through a highly diverse set of channels.18 Third, mac-
roeconomic studies are required in order to help generalize about the 
overall impact of aid on growth and economic development. Fourth, 
the aid-growth literature continues to be highly influential in shaping 
common perceptions about the significance and impact of foreign aid. 
Fifth, whether aid helps growth or not is essentially an empirical ques-
tion. 
The quantitative cross-country analyses of the macroeconomic im-
pact of foreign aid on growth, which by now span almost four dec-
ades, can be classified into three generations, see Hansen and Tarp 
(2000). Work in the first two generations (where aid’s impact on 
growth via savings and investment was in focus) was inspired by the 
simple Harrod-Domar model and the two-gap Chenery-Strout exten-
sion. This framework was, as mentioned in Section 3, extensively used 
in the past as the analytical framework of choice for assessing aid im-
pact; but from the early 1990’s, a third generation of panel based 
econometric studies came to dominate the academic and public dis-
course. This work was in part motivated by the availability of much 
 
17 The same can be said about the use of randomized programme evaluation, which 
I do not pursue as already noted above. For perspective, see Thorbecke (2005). 
18 For a pertinent cautioning set of observations, see Solow (2001). 
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better (panel) data across a range of countries and in part by insights 
emerging from new growth theory and the rapidly increasing number 
of general empirical studies of growth. In addition, the endogeneity of 
aid and other variables is addressed more consistently than before,19 
and the aid-growth relationship is appropriately perceived as non-
linear. 
The underlying idea behind the Harrod-Domar model was indeed 
simple. Assume that physical capital is the only factor of production 
(so investment is the key constraint on growth) and assume as well 
that all aid is invested. Then, it is straightforward to calculate the 
growth impact of additional aid. If aid corresponds to six per cent of 
the gross national product and the capital-output ratio is estimated at 
3.0,20 which is a rather typical estimate, then aid adds two percentage 
points a year to the growth rate. The impact of aid is clearly positive, 
and aid works by helping fill either a savings- or a foreign exchange 
gap. The latter gap relates to the argument that aid represents foreign 
currency and as such, can facilitate imports of goods and services that 
may in some cases be critically important in output production over 
and above aid’s impact on relieving the savings constraint. This kind 
of reasoning has, however, led to wildly overoptimistic expectations 
about aid’s potential impact.21 
First, it is a tall order to expect both a linear relationship between 
output and capital and that all aid is invested. As discussed in Section 
3, aid is provided for many reasons. For example, food aid in famine 
situations is not intended as an investment. In addition, the share of 
aid that ends up being invested (rather than consumed) will, in even 
the very best of circumstances, depend on the degree of fungibility of 
 
19 The wider ranging and complex econometric endogeneity problems inherent in 
relying on time averages for aid and growth, typically used in panel data growth 
regressions are laid out in Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004). They point out that 
not only aid but also policy is likely to be endogenous. 
20 Note from Figure 1 that the annual median aid to GNI ratio amounted to 6.8 per 
cent from 1993 to 2002. 
21 Whether this completely discredits the two-gap model, as argued by some aca-
demic economists, including Easterly (1999), or whether it can serve a useful pur-
pose as an admittedly very simplistic analytical framework, if applied with due care, 
in my view remains to be established. In any case, the fact is that this model con-
tinues to be widely used in practice, and whether one believes the two-gap model 
should be discarded altogether or not, the notion that aid may contribute to growth 
via investment and capital accumulation remains relevant. 
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the foreign aid transfer.22 On the other hand, even if aid adds to do-
mestic savings and investment on less than a one to one basis, aid 
does continue to have a positive impact on growth in the traditional 
line of thinking—as long as total savings and investment go up.23  
A second line of critique of the Harrod-Domar and two-gap ap-
proach has been the argument that growth is less related to physical 
capital investment (including aid) than what is often assumed (East-
erly, 2001). If the key driver of the productive impact of aid is related 
more to incentives and relative prices and more generally to the policy 
environment, then it becomes important to consider potentially dis-
tortionary effects of aid on incentives and economic policies in the aid 
receiving system and vice versa. An example is “Dutch disease”, and 
domestic demand and resource allocation may be twisted in undesir-
able directions following a large aid inflow if macroeconomic man-
agement is weak. One concrete example is that aid donors often pay 
much higher wages to national experts and staff than equally—and in 
many cases—more important national institutions.24  
Third, a large and growing literature on the political economy of 
aid, see for example Kanbur (2003), Gunning (2005) and Svensson 
(2000), has argued that if aid allows a recipient government (local el-
ites) to pursue behaviour that is in any way anti-developmental, then 
the potential positive impact of aid can be undermined. There are 
many such examples available in practice, ranging from outright mis-
use of aid by corrupt governments to more subtle issues such as the 
potential negative impact of aid on domestic taxation (Adam and 
O’Connell, 1999). 
 
22 Fungibility arises when the recipient can reallocate its own resources to other 
ends when aid is provided. There is limited and conflicting evidence on the degree 
of fungibility of foreign aid, see for example Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998). 
23 This observation goes back to Papanek (1972, 1973) and inspired Hansen and 
Tarp (2000), who reviewed 131 cross-country regressions produced over three dec-
ades. They challenged the widespread perception among academic researchers and 
aid practitioners that there are no significant macroeconomic links associated with 
foreign aid as stated by, for example, Michalopoulos and Sukhatme (1989) and 
White (1992). A re-examination of the then existing literature revealed that (i) aid 
increases savings, although not by as much as the aid inflow, (ii) aid increases in-
vestment, and (iii) aid on average has a positive effect on the growth rate whenever 
growth is driven by capital accumulation. Hansen and Tarp therefore suggested that 
the micro-macro paradox identified by Mosley (1987) to which I shall return below 
is non-existent—even in the context of the traditional aid-growth literature. 
24 See Rajan and Subramanian (2005a) for a recent contribution. 
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The third generation debate about aid’s impact on growth is 
rooted in the above kinds of observations as well as in Mosley’s 
(1987) micro-macro paradox. He suggested that while aid seems to be 
effective at the microeconomic level,25 identifying any positive impact 
of aid at the macroeconomic level is harder, or even impossible. In 
fact, the micro-macro paradox seemed self evident to many at the 
time it was formulated, where the general atmosphere was one of aid 
fatigue and lack of belief in a positive impact of aid on growth. An-
other explanation, sometimes referred to as the “Iron Law of 
Econometrics”, in the terminology of Hausman (2001), received less 
attention.26 It must never be overlooked that once we try to explain a 
“dirty” dependent variable with noisy data and weak proxies, it should 
come as no surprise that the result is biased towards zero, or in this 
case even towards the negative given the aid allocation behaviour of 
donors. What Mosley and many after him have struggled with is how 
to control for the wildly changing circumstances under which aid has 
been implemented. We can (and should) look to history and try to 
treat it as a controlled experiment but, at the end of the day, we are 
limited by the extent to which our proxies capture the massive 
changes in circumstances under which aid is implemented over time 
and across countries.  
Boone (1994) managed to stir up the aid-growth debate again in 
the early to mid-1990’s. His work was cited in The Economist on 10 
December 1994 under the colourful heading: “Aid Down the Ra-
thole”, and Boone did indeed suggest that aid does neither create, nor 
correlate with those underlying factors which cause growth. Boone 
did not, however, occupy the centre stage for long. His underlying 
theoretical model was qualified by Obstfelt (1999). Moreover, Boone 
treated the aid-growth relationship as linear and, as is the case with 
many other aid papers, did not convincingly account for the potential 
endogeneity of aid.27 Finally, and much more importantly, a highly 
influential idea spread, in part due to effective backing by the World 
 
25 Dalgaard and Hansen (2005) also discuss the micro-economic evidence on posi-
tive ex-post rates of return of World Bank aid projects, referred to above. Median 
returns range between 10 to 30 per cent for the period 1996 to 2001. 
26 Hausman (2001, p. 58) notes: “At MIT I have called this “The Iron Law of 
Econometrics”—the magnitude of the estimate is usually lower than expected. It is 
also called “attenuation” in the statistical literature”. In what follows I will use the 
technical term, attenuation bias. 
27 In Boone’s 1994 aid-growth regressions, he did not instrument for aid, but he did 
include country-fixed effects.  
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Bank. This is the idea that while aid on average has no impact on 
growth, it may still work in some countries or time periods. Burnside 
and Dollar (1997, 2000) pursued this and argued that “aid has a posi-
tive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, 
monetary and trade policies”, and they added that in “the presence of 
poor policies, aid has no positive effect on growth”. In other words, 
aid works, but only in countries with “good policy”. They based this 
conclusion on an aid-policy interaction term, introduced to capture 
the non-linearity between aid and growth, which emerged as statisti-
cally significant in their panel data analysis. In sum, Burnside-Dollar 
provided an attractive and very elegant solution to the micro-macro 
paradox with clear-cut and easy to interpret policy implications. In 
addition, they are very much in line with orthodox development 
thinking. 
Burnside and Dollar, and more recently Collier and Dollar (2001, 
2002), have used the foregoing framework as a basis for suggesting 
that aid should be directed to “good policy” countries to improve 
aid’s impact on poverty alleviation. The index meant to capture “good 
policy” has gradually been expanded from the Burnside-Dollar focus 
on budget surplus, inflation and openness to the World Bank’s Coun-
try Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index.28 The argument 
for selectively allocating aid is also, at least partly, justified with refer-
ence to the finding that the amount of aid countries receive has no 
impact on the quality of their macroeconomic policies; a finding that 
also appeared to emerge from Bank-funded research (Devarajan, Dol-
lar, and Holmgren 2001).29 While the Bank’s Monterrey document 
(World Bank, 2002) toned down these recommendations, and the 
World Bank (2005a) strikes a very different line of argument in its 
interpretation of the policy reform process during the 1990’s, the ba-
sic thrust in much of the international aid debate remains that macro-
economic performance evaluation and policy criteria should play a 
key role in aid allocation. 
 
28 The CPIA index assesses the quality of a country’s present policy and institu-
tional framework in 20 different dimensions, assessed by World Bank experts on a 
scale from 1 to 6. Each item has a 5 per cent weight in the overall rating. The items 
are grouped into four categories: “Economic Management”, “‘structural Policies”, 
“Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity” and “Public Sector Management and Institu-
tions”. 
29 This volume was reviewed by Tarp (2001). 
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The thorny academic dilemma in all this includes that: (i) Hansen 
and Tarp (2001) found that the Burnside-Dollar result is far from ro-
bust. In fact, at the time, it appeared that diminishing returns where 
aid squared is introduced into the analysis to capture non-linear ef-
fects between aid and growth was the empirical specification with 
most support in the data. In contrast, the data did not support the 
Burnside-Dollar aid-policy interaction term;30 (ii) Dalgaard and Han-
sen (2001) showed the same with the Burnside and Dollar data set, 
once it had been made available to researchers outside the World 
Bank, performing a general-to-specific test; (iii) Easterly et al. (2004) 
found the Burnside-Dollar aid-policy story to be fragile in the face of 
an expansion of the data set in years and countries; and finally (iv) 
Roodman (2004) offers a comparative assessment of the large number 
of stories on the relationship between how much foreign aid a coun-
try receives and how it grows, which the contemporary econometric 
literature has generated. He concludes that the aid-policy link (identi-
fied by Burnside-Dollar) proves the weakest, while the aid-tropics link 
(identified by Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp, 2004) is most robust.  
Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp argue that aid and policy both depend 
on the average rate of growth, even though they are predetermined in 
the original system. Therefore, they take account of this in their em-
pirical testing, which also controls for the potential endogeneity of 
institutions. In their attempt at assessing the importance of structural 
characteristics on aid effectiveness, they add the fraction of land in 
tropical areas as a proxy for climate related variables. This variable 
and its interaction with aid outperform both the “good policy” and 
“the diminishing returns” model. In concluding, Dalgaard, Hansen 
and Tarp make the point that it does appear from the data as if aid 
has been far less effective in tropical areas over the last 30 years. They 
 
30 The turning point at which increased aid will start having a negative impact on 
growth was originally estimated at around 25-40 per cent. This is, as is clear from 
Figure 1, very far above the typical aid country, and Hansen and Tarp (2000) 
warned that the empirical identification of the turning point should in any case be 
interpreted with great care. The diminishing returns thesis was not put forward as a 
definitive statement about how aid impacts, or what would happen if aid was in-
creased, but more as a way of characterizing the data and putting the fragility of the 
Burnside-Dollar policy story into perspective. When trying to capture non-
linearities in the aid-growth relation, it is advisable to test all respectable alternative 
economically and statistically meaningful specifications before conclusions are 
drawn. In sum, the diminishing returns story should not be interpreted as an argu-
ment against more aid per se. 
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also stress that it is hard to believe that aid should, inherently, be less 
potent in the tropics. The real explanation for the aid-tropics link is in 
their assessment likely to lie elsewhere; and they call for further re-
search to help disentangle the channels through which aid matters for 
productivity and efficiency. Their result also highlights that while 
there is merit in more sophisticated versions of arguments for selec-
tivity, macroeconomic allocation rules critically depend on under-
standing the complex links in particular country circumstances be-
tween aid, growth and development objectives such as poverty reduc-
tion.  
What this (and the many other studies listed in for example Clem-
ens, Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004) adds up to can in my assessment be 
summarized as follows: 
• It may well be true that “aid pays a growth price” as growth regu-
larly gives way to other concerns as the most important criterion 
for aid.31 Yet, the single most common result of recent empirical 
aid-growth studies is that aid has a positive impact on per capita 
growth.32 At the same time, aid is by no means a panacea for 
growth and poverty reduction. 
• The way in which data are dealt with to address the complex issue 
of identifying the impact of aid on growth is critically important 
for the conclusions drawn. Methodological choices matter. 
• The impact of aid on growth is not the same across aid recipients. 
There are differences in aid efficiency from country to country; 
and it remains unclear what drives these differences. In particular, 
the importance of “deep” structural characteristics in affecting 
how aid impacts on growth is not yet fully understood.  
 
 
31 Food aid in famine situations geared toward increased consumption is a specific 
case in point as is, more generally, aid for consumption that is not investment tar-
geted. 
32 Dalgaard and Hansen (2005) estimate that the aggregate real rate of return on 
foreign aid financed investments is in the range of 20-25 per cent. Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005b) are more critical, and their approach to the use of external 
instruments in cross-section analysis is potentially interesting, provided that strong 
exogenous instruments can be found. This remains to be seen. Their account of the 
panel data literature needs considerable revision to become comparable with the 
existing studies referred to above. 
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Furthermore, using “good policy” (in the form of the CPIA index) 
as a basis for selectively allocating aid is questionable. There are at 
least three reasons: 
• An attraction of the original Burnside-Dollar index was its simplic-
ity. It was controversial but easy to interpret. It is much harder to 
derive clear cut policy advice based on any positive interaction be-
tween aid and the CPIA. The CPIA is, as already noted, a compos-
ite index of 20 different variables grouped into four categories. In 
spite of the descriptive value of the CPIA index, which I do not 
question, it is from an analytical point of view far from easy to de-
cipher what drives aid efficiency when indicators of “economic 
management”, “structural policies”, “social policies” and “public 
sector management and institutions” are aggregated into one 
measure. In addition, trade-offs between the elements of the index 
are bound to arise in practice. For example, placing greater empha-
sis on budget balance (an element in “economic management”) 
may well be in conflict with improving health care, education etc. 
belonging to the component “building human resources” which 
forms part of “policies for social inclusion/equity”. Improved 
budget balance may also lead to a lower “pro-poor expenditure in-
dex” shown to be poverty reducing by Mosley, Hudson and Ver-
schoor (2004). 
• The changes in the CPIA index may be caused by the growth per-
formance, in which case the CPIA should not be used as an ex-
ogenous variable.33 Moreover, Mauro (1995) highlights that using 
expert evaluations may be problematic. The argument is that 
evaluators are likely to conclude that a particular set of institutions 
is good if the country in question is growing rapidly. 
• The use of “good policy” may lead us to punish countries with un-
favourable conditions instead of helping them. There is a very high 
probability that a country with a low CPIA is in the tropical region. 
If the variation in aid effectiveness across countries is not policy 
induced, but rather a result of poor initial conditions, a different 
approach to allocating aid must, as I see it, be established. At the 
 
33 Similar concerns are alluded to by Cornia (2005) when he points out that it is far 
from clear what can be concluded based on a negative correlation between “bad 
governance/corruption” and “slow/negative growth in GDP per capita”. It may—
in Cornia’s formulation—be that other unobserved variables are at work, such as 
“high illiteracy and low land productivity that simultaneously reduce growth and the 
salaries of civil servants, who therefore ask bribes whenever possible”. 
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same time, every effort must, of course, be made to help put in 
place improved policy, which helps growth and poverty reduction.  
 
In sum, it is advisable to be alert about what is, in fact, unknown. 
This implies, for example, that in future research on foreign aid and 
development, more attention should be given to different modalities 
of aid (such as project versus programme assistance) and their design 
and application in different types of aid receiving countries. One dif-
ficulty in this is that it is by no means straightforward to derive gen-
eral results across countries with available theory and data.34  
To put this in further perspective, it may be useful to take a prag-
matic look at the aid-growth data in Table 4 (and the three additional 
tables in the Annex). They illustrate the difficulties of coming up with 
simple aid-growth stories. Inherent in this table is the following ques-
tion: “Does aid above/below average in the 1970’s and 1980’s help 
determine whether countries were successful in terms of growth in 
the subsequent decades”? As is clear from the table, there are 16 cate-
gories of aid-growth experiences. They can be summarized as follows 
in four sets of aid-growth experiences: 
• 72 countries, a very clear majority, had below average aid in both 
the 1970’s and 1980’s. Some 21 of these countries moved from 
having negative growth in the 1980’s to positive growth in the 
1990’s and joined the 29 countries in this group that had positive 
growth in both decades. Moreover, seven of these countries (Bur-
indi, Cameroun, Chad, Kenya, Mongolia, Paraguay and Rwanda) 
turned from being positive to negative growth performers from 
the 1980’s to the 1990’s and joined the 15 that had negative growth 
in both decades. 
• 24 countries had above average aid in both the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
Seven moved from being negative growth performers in the 1980’s 
and joined the 14 that had positive growth in both decades. Only 
one country (Guinea-Bissau) moved from positive growth in the 
1980’s to negative growth in the 1990’s and joined the two (Dji-
bouti and Gabon) that had negative growth in both decades.  
• Only nine countries changed from below average aid in the 1970’s 
to above average aid in the 1980’s. They include four countries 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea and Senegal) that 
 
34 See Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) for an attempt, relying on cross-
country data. 
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moved from negative to positive growth and joined two countries 
(Jamaica and Lesotho) with positive growth in both periods. Two 
countries (Gambia and Somalia) turned from positive to negative 
growth and joined the one country in this group (Sao Tome and 
Principe) with negative growth in both periods. 
• Just five countries (Congo, Fiji, Egypt, Swaziland and Tunisia) 
changed from above average aid in the 1970’s to below average aid 
in the 1980’s. Three (Egypt, Swaziland and Tunisia) had positive 
growth in both periods. One (Fiji) changed from negative to posi-
tive growth and only one (Congo) changed from positive to nega-
tive growth. 
 
It should be recognized up-front that the implicit 10 year aid-
growth impact lag in Table 4 is longer than the four-year lag that is 
typical in cross-country regression work, and I reiterate that this kind 
of empirical overview can at best be illustrative. No causality can be 
implied. It is notable that the two largest boxes are the groups of 
countries that had (i) positive growth post-1990, but (ii) below aver-
age aid pre-1990. On the other hand, among the 24 countries that had 
above average aid pre-1990, no less than 21 had positive growth post-
1990. In other words, below average aid does not seem to prevent 
growth from occurring (or that countries change growth category). 
Similarly, above average aid does not come across as harmful to 
growth or as a factor that makes it difficult to turn a negative growth 
trend around. 
In sum, aid cannot on this basis be claimed to be a highly potent 
driver of growth and development across the board, but it is equally 
true that there is little in Table 4 to suggest that aid has done dam-
age.35 Hard and clear cut evidence is difficult to uncover from this 
kind of analysis. There is no simple answer. We do instead appear to 
be left with lots of special cases, where country-specific and other cir-
cumstances have played a key role in determining the growth out-
come and how donors reacted in the allocation of aid. This is one 
motivation why cross-country regression analysis has been so popular. 
Data are after all the plural form of anecdotes. But the picture in Ta-
ble 4 also helps suggest why controversy remains so prevalent.  
 
35 In addition to the results included in the Annex, I have experimented with a se-
ries of alterative groupings and classifications, including for example varying growth 
rates. The overall picture remains the same. 
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5. Discussion of the current aid and development  
debate 
Has foreign aid been a success or failure in promoting development? 
Based on some of the contributions to the foreign aid literature over 
the past decade, including for example the works of Boone, Burnside-
Dollar, Sachs and Easterly, it might appear that “The answer, my 
friend, is blowin’ in the wind”.36 Boone (2006) has recently reiterated 
that “the history of large aid flows is, to date, a major failure”, while 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) found that aid promotes growth, but only 
when policy is “good”.  
Nevertheless, Sachs (2005) and the UN Millennium Project (2005) 
argue emphatically that aid has worked and should be “scaled up”. 
Sachs has played a key role as special adviser to the UN Secretary 
General on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and he 
makes a concerted effort to reinstate many of the traditional argu-
ments within development economics for believing that aid works in 
helping poor countries break out of poverty traps. He refers to in-
vestments attuned to local needs and uses a vocabulary which is 
phrased along gap-filling lines of thinking. He also dismisses corrup-
tion and domestic policy failure as the fundamental “cause” of Af-
rica’s problems, and argues instead that the causal links originate in 
poverty and the lack of growth. Sachs furthermore provides (p. 259) 
“ten dramatic examples that prove the naysayers wrong”. These ex-
amples, which are referred to as “clear aid triumphs”, range from aid’s 
contribution to the Green Revolution of Asia to the eradication of 
smallpox and polio and on to the mobile phone revolution in Bangla-
desh. They demonstrate in Sachs’ words (p. 265) some common 
themes. “First and foremost, scaling up is possible when it is backed 
by appropriate and widely applicable technology, organizational lead-
ership, and appropriate financing”; and he goes on to state that in 
“the case of the Millennium Development Goals, the promising tech-
nologies exist, but have not been scaled up”. 
Cornia (2005) pointedly notes that Sachs deserves a lot of credit 
for his “passionate advocacy”. Moreover, Sachs does manage to call 
attention to at least some of the ways in which aid has helped poor 
people in the past. His suggestion that much more can and should be 
 
36 Bob Dylan song, where the full text is available at www. body-
lan.com/song/blowin.html. 
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done, in my assessment deserves attention together with his menu of 
initiatives.37 At the same time, as argued by Cornia, it is problematic 
that so much of the present development debate is being cast in terms 
of increases in aid flows for the achievement of the MDGs. This is, to 
quote Cornia, “reductionist”. It ignores that the development process 
is much more sensitive to macroeconomic, financial and technological 
changes (or their lack thereof) than to the aggregate volume of aid. In 
addition, even if it is accepted that aid works, and works well, it is 
unlikely that the MDGs can be reached if aid is increased to 0.7 per 
cent of donor GNI, as argued by Sachs. The return will in even the 
best of circumstances not be big enough. I am afraid that mobilising 
such optimistic expectations may in a few years in the final analysis 
lead to frustration and an undesired backlash.  
Over the years, Easterly has authored an impressive number of 
books and papers, a few of which are listed in the references. He is a 
sharp and articulated critic of foreign aid, and his contributions to the 
academic and the broader policy literature are influential. In two re-
cent studies, Easterly (2005, 2006), he attacks the UN Millennium 
Project and the work of Sachs head on. Easterly refers to the white 
man’s burden and ponders “Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest 
have done so much ill and so little good”. Easterly deserves a great 
deal of credit for demonstrating in his many writings that much went 
wrong in aid in the past, and he is spot on when he argues that a great 
deal of individual initiative has been stifled under the burden of dog-
matic and centralized planning practices and bureaucratic incompe-
tence in many past decades. I believe that human initiative and appro-
priate incentives are correctly identified by Easterly as two critically 
important elements in making development happen. Much can—and 
should—be gained from taking this to heart in thinking about devel-
opment and the appropriate role of foreign aid in the future.  
Sen (2006) has in a similar vein noted that there is much in East-
erly’s latest book that offers “a line of analysis that could serve as the 
basis for a reasoned critique of the formulaic thinking and policy tri-
umphalism of some of the literature on economic development”; and 
Cornia (2005) argues that Easterly is right on target in arguing that 
“poverty, mortality and so on are in fact much more sensitive to mac-
roeconomic, financial and technological changes (or their lack 
 
37 The UN Millennium Project (2005) goes on to recommend no less than 449 in-
terventions to end poverty. 
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thereof) than to the aggregate volume of aid flows”. At the same time, 
both Sen and Cornia raise a series of critical points. They range from 
what Cornia calls the “demonisation of world ‘planning’” to Sen stat-
ing that “Perhaps the weakest link in Easterly’s reasoning is his almost 
complete neglect of the distinctions between different types of eco-
nomic problems”. Space does not allow me to pursue this in detail 
here. In any case, my experience and reading of the existing analytical 
evidence does not suggest that aid has on balance “done so much ill” 
as Easterly seems to suggest, leaving aside the discussion of how 
much good it has done, except for noting that much of our present 
knowledge about what works and what does not work in develop-
ment is based on research sponsored by aid agencies (including much 
of both Easterly’s and Sach’s work—as well as my own!). Finally, I do 
sense that Easterly’s sarcastic style, and his rejection of any type of 
“planning” and coordination, gets a bit in the way of much needed 
dialogue.38  
Summing-up, Easterly and Sachs have done a commendable job in 
energizing the current debate about foreign aid; but looking ahead it 
is, in my assessment, important that their respective conflicting ap-
proaches do not end up confining a constructive and forward looking 
search for how to best design and implement aid in the future. 
Against this background, I would summarize the existing situation of 
the current aid and development debate by highlighting that there 
does seem to be a consensus about at least the following three points: 
• Much has been learnt from both successes and failures about de-
velopment and development policy over the past 50 years, and a 
great deal of disagreement remains as well. On many questions, 
our profession is still searching for appropriate answers.  
• The more than one billion people, who are living in extreme pov-
erty in today’s world, should not be left to themselves. Birdsall, 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) state: “developed countries should 
not abandon the poor to their plight”; Easterly (2005) notes: “Aid 
can still do much for the poor”; and even Boone (2006) argues 
that: “The aid successes with which we are all familiar … are im-
portant”. Much of the controversy in the academic and policy de-
 
38 It is certainly amusing to read about “Bono, Sachs, the Dalai Lama, and the 
pope” in Easterly (2001, p. 126), but as I see it, Easterly (2006) creates too many 
caricatures. While it may be good analytical economics to simplify the world, the 
real world and the development process are more complicated than that. 
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bate is about aid’s performance in the past. The need and rele-
vance of such action in the future is (ignoring the “pure” ideolo-
gists aside) not disputed,39 but whether such action is justified by 
political, economic or moral considerations varies. 
• There are many examples where aid has worked at the micro-level 
to the benefit of developing countries and their populations. It is 
also true that aid is far from flawless. There are many cases where 
aid has not worked to help the poor. Sachs (2006) notes: “Current 
aid suffers from four inter-related flaws”, and goes on to pinpoint 
these flaws. Whether all this adds up to a positive net impact on 
growth at the macro level is contentious.  
6. Conclusion 
Controversy is rampant in the debate about aid and development. 
This is not particularly surprising. Even a cursory look at history 
shows that development over the past 30-50 years has been a com-
plex and variegated process. There have been interrelated changes in 
resource accumulation, population growth, growth in knowledge and 
improvements in production technology, all operating in an environ-
ment, characterized by frequent and dramatic transformations in poli-
tics and institutions.40 Social science has to rely on interpretations of 
history in trying to come to grips with these processes, and the analyst 
must be aware of the dangers of over-simplification. Single-cause 
theories have not fared well in development economics. This reflects 
that simple policy recommendations are often inappropriate in a 
complex world, and this is so whether such recommendations have 
emanated from the planning tradition of the 1960’s and 1970’s or 
from the free market thinking of the 1980’s. 
In this paper, I have tried to highlight that one cannot conclude 
that aid has been a failure just because growth in, for example, Africa 
has been less than desired, or because projects have failed. It is ex-
ceedingly easy to arrive at a negative association between aid and 
growth, but such correlations do not provide a definitive causal an-
 
39 To illustrate this, I fully acknowledge the key incentive and agency problems as-
sociated with aid transfers such as those uncovered by Svensson (2000, 2005), and 
he does not on this basis conclude that aid is without potential impact on the de-
velopment process. 
40 See Tarp (2000), and here especially the summary and synthesis (authored with 
Sherman Robinson). 
AID AND DEVELOPMENT, Finn Tarp 
46 
swer. There is no logical inconsistency in development terms between 
little growth and aid inflows of the size experienced in the past. Aid 
allocation matters for the analysis; and complex development prob-
lems and issues are looming in the background. Major changes have 
taken place in the global economy and affected the environment in 
which aid is implemented, and targets for aid have been changing 
from one decade to the next. Simple correlation analysis or story tell-
ing cannot—and should not—be allowed to settle the causality debate 
on their own.  
As should be clear from this paper, I also recognize that cross-
country econometric studies are associated with critical methodologi-
cal choices, and that many significant changes have taken place in the 
world economy over the past decades. Coming up with the “true” 
aid-growth relationship is far from easy, and aid is of much too lim-
ited size to turn the wheels of history. Yet, this does not make it justi-
fied to reject aid as a useful instrument in the fight against poverty. If 
we are agreed that aid works at least somewhere and sometimes, then 
aid must be outright harmful elsewhere for the average impact to be 
nil. I can follow that some aid has not done all that much good, and 
this is a shame. Yet, there is a significant difference between doing 
little good and doing outright harm. I fail to see that the empirical 
evidence adds up to a suggestion that a great deal of ill has actually 
been done across an important sample of countries. Similarly, it is one 
thing to call attention to problems that should definitely be addressed, 
it is quite another to dismiss foreign aid as harmful. My overall con-
clusion is that nuanced and subtle assessments are advisable with the 
empirical evidence in hand at present. 
Burnside-Dollar added a welcome analytical nuance to Boone, as 
have others; but the Burnside-Dollar solution to the micro-macro 
paradox has been countered over and again in the literature and is 
shown to be highly delicate. Methodological choices do matter. Nev-
ertheless, the single most common result in the modern aid-growth 
literature is that aid has a positive impact on per capita growth. No 
excessive claims about parameter sizes and total aid impact should be 
made on this basis. Yet, this should not be allowed to totally over-
shadow the established results at hand. I am in this context puzzled 
that Easterly so often ignores these results and instead tries to use 
cross-country work as a basis for his critical view of foreign aid. At-
tenuation suggests that with noisy data, a “dirty” dependent variable 
and weak proxies results will be biased towards zero. Against this 
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background, the challenge is to clarify whether the data still have any-
thing meaningful to say. I believe this is indeed the case when suffi-
cient care is exercised, but simple correlations do not uncover this.41 
Turning to the debate about the allocation of aid, there is in my 
view merit in more sophisticated versions of arguments for selectivity. 
For example, it makes little sense to do structural adjustment lending 
when the macro policy environment is “bad” and there is little possi-
bility for policy reform. However, based on the empirical work on aid 
effectiveness during the past decade, I am convinced that macro crite-
ria cannot—and should not—stand alone in evaluating the effective-
ness of most development assistance and determining its allocation. 
“Good policy” can be dangerously misleading as the fundamental cri-
terion for aid allocation, and simplistic macro rules-of-thumb may 
reinforce the adversity of those living under substandard governance. 
It is a regrettable fact that many of the world’s poorest people live in 
conditions of substandard national, regional, and/or local governance 
and lack any tenable means of changing these institutions. It would be 
gravely ironic for aid agencies to compound the misfortunes of these 
people with discriminatory aid allocation.  
Overall, it is in my assessment justified to argue for increased aid, 
but expectations about its impact on growth should be kept at rea-
sonable levels. This is where the many claims of Sachs and the Mil-
lennium Project can, at times, give rise to worry. It would be unfortu-
nate if unrealistic expectations about aid impact are built up much 
along the lines of what happened back in the 1950’s and 1960’s, at the 
early stages of aid’s existence. At the same time, asserting that (i) aid 
has a positive impact; (ii) should be “scaled up”, and (iii) that its im-
pact does not appear to be conditional on “good policy”, is not in any 
way in contradiction with suggesting that future aid should be care-
fully redesigned. In this we should draw on the many insights offered 
by aid critiques, including prominent ones such as Easterly; but it 
must not be overlooked that much is indeed already happening on the 
foreign aid scene. Major shifts have taken place in aid modalities over 
the past 15 years as noted by Adam (2005). He also argues that the 
general rise of a culture of transparency and accountability is more 
than superficial, and goes on to point out that the March 2005 Paris 
 
41 One can also note that conventional wisdom at the end of the 1980’s tended to 
over-emphasize or misinterpret studies which had found a negative or insignificant 
relationship (see Hansen and Tarp, 2000). 
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Declaration of Aid Effectiveness is an attempt to codify some of the 
best-practice developments observed in a number of countries.42 
Trying, in summary, to identify three sets of core, but unresolved, 
issues and point to where further research is needed, they include as I 
see it that: 
• Foreign aid is associated with development successes and failures, 
and the fundamental analytical problem in assessing its impact is 
that nobody has to date identified the underlying development 
model. We are therefore necessarily working with reduced form 
models, which are bound to be debatable. In parallel, existing data 
suggest that foreign aid is far from equally effective everywhere. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for aid to have a positive 
contribution on the development process remain controversial. In 
other words, how to better come to grips with what actually 
“drives” existing differences in the impact of foreign aid remains a 
challenge. This is so, for example, in relation to potential interac-
tion with economic policy but the aim goes for deeper structural 
characteristics, which play a key role in my assessment. 
• We do not at present have the necessary complete and generalized 
understanding of the complex links in particular country circum-
stances between aid, growth and development objectives such as 
poverty reduction to justify selectivity as the basic approach in aid 
allocation. This does not mean that old-fashioned conditionality 
should be brought back to rule the way; but I do suggest that a 
better understanding of the intricacies of the donor-recipient rela-
tionship in theory and practice would be valuable. As key elements, 
this would include addressing issues such as (i) how to best chan-
nel resources to the poor, when national governments are not ca-
pable and/or willing to take on this task, (ii) how to ensure that aid 
delivered directly to national governments does not undermine lo-
cal accountability, and (iii) establishing the appropriate balance be-
tween aid going to the government vis-à-vis individuals and others 
in the private sector.  Accordingly, how to best strengthen incen-
tives in support of genuine domestic policy leadership (including 
the commitment to the learning-by-doing of development policy) 
is a challenge. The same goes for the fundamental task of further-
ing accountability and transparency vis-à-vis local populations. 
 
42 The text of this forum is available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/ 
34428351.pdf. See also Adam and Gunning (2002) and Adam et al. (2004). 
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• In the present drive to scale up aid, it is critically important to 
avoid making the mistake of the past of promising too much, i.e. 
of contributing to the misconception that aid can turn history on 
its own. It will be clear from my review that I find, based on his-
tory, that aid has much to offer, but managing expectations is far 
from easy. How to best make sure promises actually made are 
kept, is demanding. There are many unresolved issues here, includ-
ing how to best design incentives in aid agencies to meet this chal-
lenge alongside topics such as the role of independent evaluation, 
coordination among multiple donors, and the need to sharpen the 
incentives for recipients to maximize “reform effort”, which are all 
alluded to by Adam (2005).  
 
In conclusion, I would like to stress, first, that it would be gravely 
ironic if we let disagreement about overall development strategy and 
the macroeconomic impact of aid get in the way of pursuing practical 
and useful aid funded activities in poor countries. There is much to 
criticize in foreign aid, but possibilities for constructive and forward 
looking action should be kept in mind throughout. There are, in my 
experience, lots of such activities out there in practice. They deserve 
to be uncovered more precisely and effectively implemented to the 
benefit of those in need. 
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